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TRUTH IN ACTION: REVITALIZING CLASSICAL
RHETORIC AS A TOOL FOR TEACHING ORAL
ADVOCACY IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS
I. INTRODUCTION

Effective oral argument is crucial for success in legal
advocacy. Close cases are won or lost on the summation, or
closing argument. In criminal law, denial of a closing argument
has been treated as a violation of due process. 1 Harry Kalodner
describes "oral argument [as] the seasoning to the brief.
Effectively presented it makes more palatable to the judge [or
jury] the dish of controversy served him by the opposing
parties."2 Just as a chef carefully chooses a combination of
ingredients and seasonings, a trial lawyer carefully chooses
words and images to appeal to the senses of the judge or jury.
Trial lawyers must develop oral argumentation skills because
they are not usually born with a golden tongue. In Alice in
Wonderland an intriguing method of developing a lawyer's
skills in arguing is disclosed: '"In my youth,' said his father, 'I
took to the law, And argued each case with my wife; And the
muscular strength which it gave to my jaw Has lasted the rest
of my life."'3 While this methodology may not be entirely sound,
it reflects the generally held belief that trial lawyers need some
sort of system to develop techniques of oral argument. Most
trial lawyers, however, are thrown into practice without ever
receiving this essential training. If law schools revived classical
rhetoric methodologies, then students could effectively develop
oral argument skills essential to realize the goal of the U.S.
legal system-to find and express truth.
Even though Johnnie Cochran, Jr. and Cicero defended
men accused of murder in different legal systems, and 2000
years apart from each other, they still used many of the same
1. Myron L. Gordon, Non Jury Summations, 6 Am Jur. Tr. 771, 779 (1967).
2. Harry E. Kalodner, "The Matter of Oral Argument," 1 Practical L. 12, 15.
3. Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland 48 (Grossett & Dunlap 1996).
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rhetorical devices. However, Cicero purposely used rhetorical
devices to enhance logical appeals to his jury, while Cochran
used rhetorical devices unsystematically to make emotional
and ethical appeals. Although both men had the same goal of
winning their cases, Cicero was able to use truth as a means to
victory while Cochran used emotional appeals as a means to
victory. Although Cochran is a well-known and highly skilled
lawyer, his skills, though less methodical than Cicero's, are not
altogether common among lawyers and law students.
Increasingly, judges have complained of the lack of talented
and skilled orators that argue in their courtrooms.
It takes years of experience and consistent practice for an
attorney to develop strong oral argumentation skills.
Unfortunately, most law students have only one experience
with oral argument (the first-year moot court competition), and
even less receive actual training in oral argument during law
school. In effect, each law student must "re-invent the wheel" of
oral advocacy. Law schools, however, may improve law
students' oratory skills by adopting methodologies similar to
classical rhetoric.
This paper will first analyze the problems with the current
oral advocacy pedagogy and present why a new system is
needed. Part II explains how classical rhetoric can be used to
solve the current deficiencies in oral advocacy education. Part
III discusses how classical and modern oral arguments can be
used as teaching tools. Part IV offers conclusions about the
comparison and the significance of these two styles to
contemporary American legal oratory.

II.

THE PROBLEM WITH AMERICAN ORAL ADVOCACY
EDUCATION

A.

Importance of Oral Advocacy

Oral argument plays an essential role in the decisionmaking processes of the courts. Arguments before the Supreme
Court of the United States are tape-recorded and transcribed
for use by the justices and law clerks as they draft opinions.
Oral argument is not only essential for trial lawyers as they
attempt to persuade the jury, but oral argument is the
attorney's last chance to prevail in appellate court, and it is the
attorney's only opportunity to establish a human connection
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with the judge. 4 Chief Justice Rehnquist counsels advocates
that oral argument "is the only opportunity that you will have
to confront face-to-face the nine members of the Court who will
ponder and decide your case. The opportunity to convince them
of the merits of your position is at its highpoint."5 Justice Re of
the United States Court of International Trade also testifies to
the power of oral argument: "speech may succeed where the
printed word has failed." 6 Justice Brennan even reveals that:
"(o]ften my whole notion of what a case is about crystallizes at
oral argument."7 "Appellate judges virtually without exception,
say that a case should never be submitted without oral
argument."8 Despite the need for good legal oratory, it is
almost a thing of the past.
Frederick Weiner discusses whether law schools must adopt
a method of teaching oral argumentation:
Should advocacy be taught? Anyone who has spent any
length of time in an appellate court, whether for
instructional purposes, on a busman's holiday, or simply
waiting for his own case to be reached, will answer that
advocacy needs to be taught, and that it needs to be
learned. Too many, far too many, lawyers burden courts
of appeal with poorly prepared, poorly presented, and
thoroughly unhelpful arguments-for which they
receive, and clients pay, substantial and not
infrequently handsome fees. Even after making due
allowance for the frailties of mankind, it is amazing how
few good arguments are presented and heard, even in
the highest state and federal tribunals. Within the year
I have been told by a justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States that four out of every five arguments to
which he must listen are "not good." And comments
from judges of other appellate courts give me no reason
to suppose that the percentage of good arguments is
perceptibly higher elsewhere.
Recently a representative cross-section of the graduates
4. Whitney N. Seymour, Sr. Foreword in Edward D. Re & Joseph R. Re Law
Students' Manual on Legal Writing and Oral Argument xvii-xviii, 146 (Oceana
Publications 1991).
5. J. Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy, 27 S. Tex. L. Rev. 289, 303 (1986).
6. Re, supra n. 6, at 145.
7. Harvard Law School, Proceedings in Honor of Mr. Justice Brennan Harv. L.
Sch. Occasional Pamphlet Number Nine 22 (1967).
8. Frederick B. Weiner, Oral Advocacy, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 56-58 (1948).
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of the Harvard Law School was polled by the faculty,
and asked to rank 'the skills of a lawyer' in the order of
importance in the graduates' particular branches of
practice. 'The lowest rating, by a fairly wide margin,
was given to skill in advocacy'.
Even if this response simply means that most Harvard
Law alumni never get to court, but instead devote most
of their energies to the office or to the conferences or
consultations with clients, the rating is amazing-and,
it is submitted, amazingly wrong. For whenever a
lawyer negotiates, or puts a proposition to a client, or
even when he discusses a difference of opinion with a
partner, he is engaged in [oral] advocacy-the process of
trying to convince people of something, the technique of
persuasion .... Advocacy is not simply screaming at an
appellate court or being 'positive' in the Ambrose Bierce
sense, which to say, wrong in a loud tone of voice ....
And since when has skill in persuading a particular
group of hearers to decide in his favor become a minor
factor in the skill of a lawyer?
Some lawyers feel that oral argument is unimportant,
because 'the judges will study the briefs.' The brutal,
hard fact is that some cases are won and lost on oral
argument. (footnotes omittedf
Despite Weiner's words of warning and testimony of the
importance of oral advocacy, law schools have continued to
reduce the amount of emphasis on oral advocacy.
B.

Current Oral Advocacy and Law School Pedagogy

Both legal practitioners and scholars acknowledge that
even in the last decade oral advocacy has been neglected in
many ways: "The need for good advocacy is clear and the
shortage of good advocates is the subject of frequent
comment. . . . Experienced judges know, and, indeed, many
proclaim that the quality of their performance depends heavily
on the skill and breadth of the advocacy which they can
consider in reaching their judgments ... there is a tragic
shortage of trained advocates to take up the slack" (Emphasis
added). 10 The literature on the importance of trial oral advocacy

9.ld.
10. Seymour, supra n. 4.
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is even more vast than that on appellate oral advocacy.
Nevertheless, most manuals on trial oral advocacy only include
suggestions and explanations concerning the Federal Rules of
Evidence rather than outlining methods, techniques, and
exercises. Most manuals on trial advocacy are also intended for
practitioners rather than for law students.
Why is oral advocacy not being taught? Scholars and
practitioners have offered many explanations. Some point to
the sharp reduction in time allowed for oral argument in
appellate court, or the crushing burdens of increased business
in trial courts. 11 Some commentators find that because
attorneys' skill in oral advocacy is declining, judges neglect oral
argument. Ultimately, the lack of good oral advocacy springs
from the lack of a real methodology.
While many law schools seem to assume that oral advocacy
skills can be easily acquired after graduation, some schools are
starting to recognize the need for teaching it. 12 Good oral
argument pedagogy requires a set of tools that are clearly
defined, readily applicable, and flexible so that an advocate can
both increase her level of preparation as well as "think on her
feet." Though many critics have excellent ideas that should be
incorporated into law school pedagogy, none, or few, of these
critics have offered a coherent and comprehensive system for
the way oral advocacy should be learned or taught. Though
Professor Landau recognizes that oral advocacy is important
and that law schools have an important hand in the
development of young lawyers' oral advocacy skills, he only
devotes one chapter to these skills in his book Legal Reasoning,
Writing, and Oral Advocacy .13
Though Judge Re recognizes the importance of oral
argument in his Law Students' Manual on Legal Writing and
Oral Argument, he does not present a formal system of
methodology. 14 In fact, Judge Re only devotes one chapter to
oral argument. He discusses knowledge of the record, use of
written notes, content of notes (including arrangement of facts,
issues, and law), time allowed, time shared with co-counsel,
and rehearsal of argument. He dips into the rhetorical canons
11. Weiner, supra n. 8, at 56-57.
12. Id.
13. Jack L. Landau. Legal Reasoning, Writing, and Oral Advocacy vol. 2. 675
(N.W. Sch. ofL., Lewis and Clark College 1980).
14. Re, supra n. 4.
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of Delivery and Style and testifies of the importance of
understanding rhetorical situation and audience, but he
appears to direct his comments specifically at practitioners.
There is not enough detail for this instruction to be meaningful
to a law student and there are no exercises for the classroom.
In Trial Advocacy: A Systematic Approach, Leonard Packel
and Dolores Spina attempt to put forth a system that oral
advocates can use in the trial process. 15 While the book appeals
to practitioners, law students will find the section on keeping a
Trial Book useful. In the Trial Book, the advocate keeps
various pleadings, briefs, memos, research, and notes. This is
similar to the commonplace book of ancient rhetoric in which
the student would keep an organized compilation of his
thoughts, readings, analysis, and imitations in preparation for
oral argument. Planning and preparation should be included in
the law school methods to train students in oral advocacy.
Packel and Spina's system, however, does not offer methods to
improve an advocate's skills in oral argument aside from
general suggestions about style and delivery.
Most advocacy texts primarily focus on legal writing and
research. A prominent and widely used Advocacy text,
Introduction to Legal Writing and Oral Advocacy mirrors most
advocacy texts or instruction books by focusing on general
ideas about style and delivery with some commentary on
arrangement. 16 The text advises the budding oral advocate to
know the record, study the proper authorities, know the
arguments, outline the arguments, prepare argument aids, and
rehearse the argument. Although the book includes excellent
appendices with examples of printed oral arguments, it
contains few exercises or precise methods on how to prepare
argument aids or what some examples of the best aids are.
The books mentioned previously are some of the most
relevant sources of oral argument instruction; yet very few, if
any, form part of the law school curriculum set by the
American Bar Association (ABA). In its standards for
accreditation, the ABA merely states that students must
15. Leonard Packel & Dolores Spina, Trial Advocacy: A Systematic Approach
(The Am. L. Inst. 1984)
16. Karen K. Porter, Nancy L. Schultz, Lauren Scott, Louis J. Sirico, Jr., &
Annemiek N. Young, Introduction to Legal Writing and Oral Advocacy. (Matthew
Bender & Co. 1989); See also Steven Lubet, Modern Trial Advocacy: Law School
Edition (Natl. Inst. for Tr. Advoc.).
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receive "instruction in the substantive law, values and skills
(including legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem
solving and oral and written communication) generally
regarded as necessary to effective and responsible participation
in the legal profession ... "17 This reference to "oral
communication" could simply be represented by regular class
participation-though a student may only participate once in a
semester in a given class. While the ABA requires one
substantial legal writing experience the first year and one
additional writing subsequently, it has no specific requirement
that students complete an oral argument, a specific amount of
practice in oral advocacy, or structured training. 18 Many
schools have followed the pattern set by the ABA
Most law school advocacy programs focus on research and
writing disproportionately to oral argumentation. In fact, most
law students are only required to give one oral argument in the
culmination of their first year. Rarely are law students ever
required to take additional courses requiring oral advocacy. At
Georgetown, students develop some oral skills in its advocacy
program, but the program mostly focuses on legal writing and
citation. 19 University of California Davis offers Introduction to
Law, Legal Research, and Legal Writing courses, but it does
not mention a specific oral advocacy course in its general
description of first year courses. 2° Columbia University offers
the first-year moot court experience where law students must
write a brief and argue the case orally. 21 The University of
Chicago follows the same trend, as law students are merely
required to argue a case once before a panel of judges composed
22
of faculty members and practicing attorneys. Duke University
also generally focuses on legal research and writing but
requires a "mandatory oral advocacy component during the
second semester administered by the moot court board," for
which students will receive instruction in basic principles of
appellate oral advocacy and participate in an oral argument. 23
17. ABA Program of Leg. Educ., Standard 302(a)(l). <http://www.abanet.org/
legaled/standards/chapter3.html>.
18. ld. at 302(a)2.
19. Anita Montano, Introduction to Advocacy: The Legal Research and Writing
Course at J. Reuben Clark School of Law Appendix 1 (BYU Press 2001).
20. !d. at 2.
21. ld. at 5.
22. Id. at 6.
23. !d. at 7.
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Stanford University follows a similar pattern. 24
Some law schools, however, are making oral advocacy a
higher priority. Cornell University offers one semester of
instruction in written and oral advocacy, focusing on
techniques essential in a courtroom setting. 25 The University of
Southern California (USC) declares: "To be effective, lawyers
must incisively analyze legal principles and apply them to
facts, and also communicate articulately-both in writing and
orally."26 Still, the only opportunity students have to develop
their oral skills is through a first-year moot court program. The
University of Virginia claims to have an innovative program in
which law students must develop presentation skills. Virginia's
program is unique because it is one of the few programs that
require students to develop skills rather than simply require
students to give an oral argument. 27
While most law schools require students to give an oral
argument, they rarely provide formal instruction on oral
advocacy. Generally, students practice oral arguments with
peers or once in front of a teacher. Even worse, oral advocacy is
something that is thrown in at the end of the semester, rather
28
than integrated into the entire course.
Most lawyers and law school professors agree that current
law school oral advocacy programs do not properly prepare all
law students for legal practice; rather, those with oral advocacy
skills will carry them on while others will be left to develop
them on their own. 29 While many ideas to improve oral
advocacy and pedagogy in law schools are floating around, a
clear method has yet to be defined. The wise Judge Wilkin
wrote speaking of the ancient legal orators, "These founders of
the profession were masters of the word, both spoken and
written." 30 Advocates and law school advocacy instructors
should look to classical rhetoric in the hands of the ancient
24. Id. at 8.
25. I d. at Appendix 2.
26. I d. at Appendix 4.
27. I d. at Appendix 6.
28. Personal interview (records on file with author).
29. Michael H. Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning Theory and
Instructional Design Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 S. D. L. Rev. 34 7, 3534, 365 (2001).
30. Edward D. Re, Chief Judge United States Court of International Trade,
Distinguished Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law, quoting Robert N.
Wilkin, The Spirit of the Legal Profession 22 (Yale U. Press 1938).
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legal orators for a blueprint of oral advocacy pedagogy. As
advocates and instructors become familiar with the rhetorical
structure, they can easily add their own ideas to continue to
improve current oral advocacy.

III. THE SOLUTION: REVIVING CLASSICAL METHODOLOGY IN
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS

A.

A Road Map of Classical Rhetoric

Classical Rhetoric embodies a pedagogical system that can
aid students as they develop skills of oral argument in the
preparation stages (using Invention and Arrangement) as well
as presentation stages (through Delivery, Style, and Memory).
Classical rhetoric was the dominant discipline for developing
legal arguments from the fifth century B.C. until the first
31
quarter of the nineteenth century. Classical rhetoric was the
methodology that ancient Roman and Greek orators used to
harness the power inherent in language. Rhetoric was
epistemic as well as persuasive. Epistemic rhetoricians used
language to find truth-as in the Socratic dialogues.
Persuasive rhetoricians used the intricacies of language to
persuade an audience of an already discovered truth or, in the
case of the Sophists, a probability or possibility. Legal
rhetoric-termed apologia, or defense-was a combination of
epistemic and persuasive rhetoric.
Fundamentally, rhetoric was separated into five canons:
Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory, and Delivery. Legal
orators utilized these canons to create and organize arguments,
to improve eloquence, and to increase powers of recall and
presentation. Within the canon of Invention, topoi, or topics,
32
assisted orators in developing legal arguments. The canon of
Style contained exhaustive catalogues of figures of speech that
were divided into two categories: (1) schemes, or artful
deviations from the ordinary arrangements of words, and (2)
tropes, or creative variations on the meanings ofwords. 33
31. See Edward P.J. Corbett, Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student 540 (3d
ed., Oxford U. Press 1990).
32. See Appendix A for a sample of the Common and Special Topics of Invention;
see also Gideon 0. Burton, Silva Rhetoricae, <http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetorid
Figures/schemes% 20and%20Tropes.htm>.
33. I d.; see Appendix B for a sample of schemes and tropes.
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Legal orators used the methods of these five canons to
appeal to a jury's sense of ethos, pathos, and logos. 34 These
three appeals, or modes of proof, often worked together and will
be addressed at greater length in the analysis of the two cases
at hand. Ethos deals with how the speaker represents himself
and his client, pathos deals with how the speaker appeals to his
audience, and logos deals with the logic of the words
themselves and how the speaker interacts with the audience.
This inquiry will largely focus on Cicero's and Cochran's use of
Invention and Style to appeal to their audience's ethos, pathos,
and logos. Also, examining the inner-workings of ancient
rhetorical schools will introduce the reader to Arrangement,
Memory, and Delivery.
B.

Ancient Rhetorical Schools as Preparation for the Court: A
Blueprint for Today

Prominent Roman orators like Cicero honed their oratorical
skills in rhetorical schools. These schools focused first on
preparation. Students read orations and observed other orators
so that they could eventually imitate these orators in
declamation. Today, however, law schools generally prohibit
first-year students from seeing other students' or practitioners'
work before they complete their advocacy briefs and oral
arguments to ensure that students do original work.
The typical Roman school day included detailed instruction
on oratory. Master orators taught students different schemes,
tropes, canons of rhetoric, and forms of arrangement. 35 Students
attended public demonstrations of oratory. 36 They also gave
practice speeches in their daily preparation. 37 Rhetorical
classrooms were described as dramatic, colorful, and
imaginative, though some scholars today argue that these
accounts may have been exaggerated. 38 Like contemporary law
schools, Roman schools taught students to examine both sides
of a controversy. 39
34. See Aristotle's Treatise on Rhetoric 1356a 1-33 (Thomas Hobbes, trans., D.A.
Talboys 1833) (claims these are the only 3 modes of proof).
35. E. Patrick Parks, The Roman Rhetorical Schools as a Preparation for the
Courts under the Early Empire 62 (Johns Hopkins Press 1945).
36. ld. at 63.
37. ld. at 64. see also The Institution Oratoria of Quintilian (H.E. Butler, trans.,
Harv. U. Press 1966) (especially Books I and II).
38. ld. at 67.
39. ld. at 80.
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One specific example of the many exercises that were used
in the ancient rhetorical schools was the Declamatory
exercises-declamationes. 40 Declamationes served as a medium
through which a student could develop a judicial mind and the
ability to speak eloquently. 41 The suasoriae preceded the
controuersiae, and the suasoriae was the part of the exercise
that taught the student to think, while the controuersiae was
the exercise in which he learned to present. 42 Before students
attempted the declamation, the teacher gave them advice, a
sermo. Typically, the master orator would present students
with a problem, or case, offer analysis, and then assign
students to work through the problem themselves. After the
students used different rhetorical devices to help solve the
problem and express the solution eloquently in writing, the
master orator would make corrections. Finally, the students
had to commit their answer to memory for oral presentation. 43
Imitation was another essential tool used in ancient
44
rhetorical schools.
The pseudo-Ciceronian Rhetorica ad
Herennium taught that skill in discourse is acquired by theory,
imitation, and practice. 45 !socrates, in his Against the Sophists
first suggested the value of imitating accomplished orators. 46
Aristotle, in Chapter IV of his Poetics, mentioned that man is
the most imitative of all creatures, that he learns first by

40. Examples of such declamations are recorded in the work of the great Roman
orator Seneca the Elder, Oratorum et rhetorum sententiae divisions colores, in the
Declamationes (19 Majores and 145 Minores) of Quintilian, and in the 51 Excerptae
decen rhetorum minorum of Calpurnicus Flaccus. Some of these examples have been
lost, and some are merely excerpts of notes taken by Roman instructors. Further, many
of the applications of the controversiae of the declamation argument have been
criticized as bizarre or fanciful. ld. at 78. Thus, I would not necessarily suggest that
contemporary advocacy teachers use these examples directly in their instruction; yet, I
would promote the processes and exercises that these ancient orators used to instruct
students, rather than the applications of them.
41. I d. at 67.
42. ld. at 85.
43. ld. at 66.
44. Erasmus' masterpiece De copia verborum ac rerum (1528) was the popular
text to which many Renaissance schools applying classical rhetoric eventually referred.
It contained a meticulous delineation of the "flexible methodology" of imitation
required to achieve "copia" or the "flexibility with language and ideas, based upon a
proficiency in varying models, that prepared [students) to adapt to specific needs of
discourse."
45. The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present 252-3
(Patricia Bizzell & Burce Herzberg, eds., Bedford Books of St. Martin's 1990).
46. ld. at 45.
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imitation, and that he naturally delights in imitative works. 47
Major classical rhetoricians such as Longinus, Cicero, and
Quintilian also recommended the practice of imitation.
Unfortunately, the technique of imitation has been
misunderstood and curtailed.
Many law professors view
imitation with distaste because they think that it gives
students a disincentive to come up with original arguments. In
"The Theory and Practice of Imitation in Classical Rhetoric,"
Edward P.J. Corbett, quoting Donald Graves' in Rhetoric and
Composition: A Sourcebook for Teachers and Writers, explains
that the term "imitation" had a variety of meanings in
antiquity. For example, Imitation was often understood in the
same context as the Latin word similis, to make someone
similar to someone else who was superior. 48 Quintilian
explained this aspect of Imitation in positive terms:
In fact, we may note that the elementary study of every
branch of learning is directed by reference to some
definite standard that is placed before the learner. We
must, in fact, be either like or unlike (aut similes aut
dissimiles) those who have proved their excellence. It is
rare for nature to produce such resemblance, which is
more often the result of imitation. 49
Though classical rhetoricians did not view similarity
negatively, "similar" did not mean "identical." The Latin verb
aemulari, from which emulate is derived, meant "to try to rival
or equal or surpass" and had roughly the same roots as imitari,
which meant "to produce an image of."50
All imitative exercises involved two steps: Analysis and
Genesis. In Analysis, students did a close reading, or
51
prelection, of the model work, and students analyzed the
merits and weaknesses of arrangement and style. 52 In Genesis,
students attempted to produce something similar to the model.
The students, however, were eventually severed from their
models and asked to write on their own. In the process, the
47. Aristotle, Poetics 34 (Stephen Halliwell, trans., U. of N.C. Press 1987).
48. Rhetoric and Composition: A Sourcebook for Teachers and Writers (Richard L.
Graves, ed., 3d ed., Boynton/Cook 1990).
49. ld. at 230.
50. Id.
51. For an intricate description of the classroom procedure of imitation, see
Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria II, v, 6-16; see also Plato, Phaedrus, in Bizzell, supra n.
45 (where Socrates analyzes a speech by Lysias).
52. Graves, supra n. 48, at 231.
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students developed rhetorical tools and a rich store of linguistic
models. 53
In addition to lexical analysis, phonetic analysis was an
important part of imitation methodology. Teachers had
students read their models aloud, alerting students' ears to the
pronunciation, rhythms, vowel lengths, and meters of a work.
Students even identified which meters were more appropriate
for the beginning, middle, and end of their orations. Through
this technique, students learned to recognize, remember, and
imitate the metrical harmonies of language.
Students also analyzed figures of speech in imitative
exercises. Renaissance pedagogues believed it was essential for
students to search out eloquent ways that orators expressed
themselves and implement these models in their own work.
Erasmus summed up humanist thought with respect to
imitation: " ... thumb the great authors by night and day ...
We must keep our eyes open to observe every figure of speech
that they use, store it in our memory once observed, imitate it
once remembered, and by constant employment develop an
expertise by which we may call upon it instantly."54 Because
this technique was so successful, countless books were
published outlining the schemes and tropes of language so that
students might readily draw on them in analyzing their
models. 55
Law students today should also be given the opportunity to
benefit from imitative exercises. Such exercises will sharpen
students' memories and creativity and will help them develop a
catalogue of tools to solve problems and express their
arguments well. With the advent of the Internet and other
multi-media resources, advocacy instructors could direct their
students to excellent examples of the best legal orators of our
day. Law students could carefully examine the strengths and
weaknesses of lawyers' oral arguments and imitate the
techniques of their modern day "superiors." Students would
still have a chance, as Quintilian suggested, to surpass what
has already been done.
Another
essential
exercise
of
imitation
was
53. See Appendix A.
54. Burton, supra n. 32.
55. Examples of such books include John Palsgrave's translation of The Comedy
of Acolastus (Oxford U. Press 1937), which included marginal notes pointing out
figures. See also Angel Day, The English Secretorie (1596).
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progymnasmata 56 defined as "a set of rudimentary exercises
intended to prepare students of rhetoric for the creation and
performance of complete practice orations."57 These exercises
consisted of fourteen types of imitation. Students would apply
what they had learned in exercises of Analysis and develop
ideas or quotations from their commonplace books to these
preliminary forms of composition. These written exercises
ranged from description, to narrative amplification, maxims
and fables, encomium, vituperation, and defending and
attacking the law. 58
Progymnasmata exercises addressed skills that all law
students need to develop. Composing encomiums, in which the
speaker praises his subject by developing details from his
background and personal characteristics, and vituperations, in
which the author criticizes his subject by the same means, alert
the law student to tone and audience. Amplifying a quotation,
as one would when practicing a chreia, proverb or maxim, aid
the law student in learning how to persuasively develop an
idea. Description teaches the law student to give greater
attention to facts and details and improves storytelling
abilities.
Such exercises produced the most admired and effective
legal orators of all time. Through rhetorical education, the
Roman legal mind "acquired a keener sense of critical inquiry,
leading it to view the law from all its possible angles and to
arrive, thereby, at that universal and humane interpretation,
so inherent a quality of the full flower of the Roman law."59
Because Roman legal orators were rigorously trained in
rhetorical methods, they were able to think and speak on their
own once they were released into the courtroom. Furthermore,
rhetoric's emphasis on truth and morality insured that no
matter what conclusions legal orators reached, the orators
would act ethically. Further, one of the characteristics of the
declamation exercise was that the students were supposed to
attempt to inject some original, creative interpretation into a
case. 60 Thus, students' minds were expanded from critical to
creative thought. This is different from many law schools
56. See Appendix B: Progymnasmata.
57. Burton, supra n. 32.
58. For a complete listing of the progymnasmata, see Appendix B.
59. Parks, supra n. 35, at 78-79.
60. Id.
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today, where in their briefs students are heavily evaluated on
their technical skill and how closely they follow the structure
presented to them by the teacher.
These are only a few of many exercises available through
rhetoric. Legal oral advocacy educators must delve deep into
the rhetorical tradition for many more examples of useful
exercises and techniques that will help law students achieve
eloquence.

C.

The Modern Critical View of Classical Rhetoric

While the modern legal education system lacks concrete
methodologies for teaching oral advocacy, many scholars are
reluctant to accept classical rhetoric as the answer. 61 Though
Roman legal rhetoric is rarely mentioned in law school classes
or courtrooms today, interest in pathos and ethos and the
power of rhetoric is slowly surfacing in the speeches and
writings of our greatest oral advocates as well as in the work of
62
respected academicians. Recently, legal oratory scholars have
begun to reclaim rhetoric as a valuable tool in oral
argumentation. Gerald Frug of Stanford University suggested
that we abandon the search for the basis of legal argument,
seemingly always out of the reach of advocacy programs and
young lawyers, and "replace such a search with a focus on legal
argument's effects, in particular, on its attempts to persuade. I
suggest, in other words, that we look at legal argument as an
example of rhetoric." 63 Many other academicians and
practitioners see the value of legal rhetoric as it was used by
Cicero-expressing civic virtue and political stability as well as
providing intellectual structure. Nevertheless, rhetoric is
rarely, if ever, applied in law school training. Law students
continue to lack a comprehensive system of methodology for

61. They view the formal logic used in rhetoric as limited because "it can only be
used in easy cases where the facts and the legal rule are clear cut."
62. See Francis J. Mootz III, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practice and Theory,
6 S. Cal. Interdisciplinary L.J. 491 (1998); see also Bernard E. Jacob, Ancient Rhetoric,
Modern Legal Thought, and Politics: A Review on the Translation of Viehweg's "Topics
of Law" 89 N.W. U. L. Rev. 1622 (1995); Thomas M. McDonnell, Playing Beyond the
Rules: A Realist and Rhetoric-based Approach to Researching the Law and Solving
Legal Problems, 67 UMKC L. Rev. 285 (1998); James B. White, Law as Rhetoric,
Rhetoric as Law: the .l.rts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684
(1985); James B. White, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modern
Lawyer, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 849 (1983).
63. Jerry Frug, Argument as Character, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 869, 872 (1988).
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oral argumentation.
As we explore the rhetoric of Cicero and Cochran, separated
by two millennia, the advantages of the classical rhetorical
method should become clear. Perhaps this classical
methodology, once a powerful part of the Roman civil law
tradition, will once again find a home in our hearts, in our
minds, and in our legal tongues as part of our own
contemporary American legal education tradition.
IV. A COMPARISON OF CLASSICAL AND MODERN ORAL
ADVOCACY TECHNIQUES

One of the most effective techniques of classical rhetorical
education is imitation. By studying the skills of those who
have mastered them, students can develop a foundation from
which they can continuously draw while still discovering their
own style. In the following sections, I present an analysis of
the techniques of two skilled orators as an example of how
classical rhetoric studies can make students more aware of oral
advocacy skills.
A. Cicero v. Cochran
1. Cicero's Pro Cluentio and the Roman Legal and Political
Atmosphere

By the time Cicero took on Pro Cluentio in 66 B.C., his
rhetorical abilities were highly developed, and he had secured
the title of Praetor in the Roman government. 64 Though of
humble birth, Cicero had studied Greek and Roman rhetoric
abroad. He had used his mastery of language to rival the
wealth and power of politicians and noble men of Rome. Cicero
had successfully defended many clients against well-known
advocates and improbable odds. Cicero and most Roman legal
orators primarily spoke before large crowds in the Forum-the
center for Roman civic activity. 65 The Forum was filled with
jurists and civic leaders who evaluated the cases and rendered
decisions. When arguing Pro Cluentio, Cicero had to be
sensitive to a jury of Senators and Equestrian Orders of noble
64. John T. Kirby, The Rhetoric of Cicero's Pro Cluentio (J.C. Gieben 1990).
65. Richard L. Enos, The Literate Mode of Cicero's Legal Rhetoric 4 7 (S. Ill. Univ.
Press 1988).
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birth, legal education, and wealth. 66 Senate members familiar
with the law and legal rhetoric "frequently interrupted
proceedings with boisterous cries of approval and
disapproval." 67 The public also attended since trials were
flavored with scandal and heightened by the eloquence of legal
orators. 68 At a time of moral decay and political crisis in Rome,
the Forum also became a platform for advancing Roman
values, and Cicero became one of the greatest spokesmen for
virtue and truth, using legal rhetoric to find and expound the
truth of a case. 69
Pro Cluentio is one of Cicero's most elaborate and complex
legal orations. The argument is divided into 202 sections that
will be referred to by section number in the subsequent
analysis. Cicero was defending Aulus Cluentius Habitus on a
charge of poisoning Oppianicus. The case was prejudiced by
rumors that Cluentius had bribed the court to get Oppianicus
convicted in a previous case and stories that depicted
Oppianicus as a virtuous and honest statesman. 7° Cicero's
powerful rhetoric, however, aided him to unfold the truth and
to eloquently convince the jury of Cluentius's innocence.
2. People v. Orenthal James Simpson and Contemporary
American Criminal Law

When O.J. Simpson was accused of murdering his ex-wife,
Nicole Brown Simpson, and Ronald Goldman, Simpson
summoned a "dream team" of attorneys led by Johnnie
Cochran, Jr. Cochran appealed to masses of television viewers,
as well as a Los Angeles jury composed of nine Blacks, two
Whites, and one Hispanic. 71 Mr. Cochran simply had to
persuade the jury that Simpson was innocent since once the
accused is acquitted, the prosecution cannot appeal. This was
not as easy a task as it seems, however. Defendants are
convicted in 75 percent to 80 percent of contested criminal

66. ld. at 16.
67. ld. at 47.
68. Id. at 48.
69. Id. at 47.
70. Cicero: In Twenty-Eight Volumes vol. IX (H. Grose Hodge, trans., Harv. U.
Press 1979).
71. Alan M. Dershowitz, Reasonable Doubts: The O.J. Simpson Case and the
Criminal Justice System 12 (Simon & Schuster 1996).
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cases. 72 Even though it seemed that the odds and evidence were
against him, O.J. Simpson was acquitted on October 3, 1995,
due in large part to Cochran's abilities to persuade the jury
that Simpson was innocent-or at least that there was a
reasonable doubt of his guilt.

B. Ethos
Of the three modes of proof, ethos deals with how the
audience views the speaker. In the Roman legal system, a
defendant was entitled to a patronus, or advocate. There were
three ways an advocate could appeal to ethos: (1) through his
reputation or "prevenient ethos," (2) through "argued ethos," or
how the advocate portrays himself or his client during the
argument, and (3) through "negative ethos," imputing bad
character to the opponent or proving that bad character was
incorrectly attributed to the defendant.

1. Cicero's Effective Appeal to Ethos in Pro Cluentio
Cicero's reputation was already well-known and respected,
so he merely mentions his prevenient ethos in §§144-145. 73 He
also reminded the jury of his extensive knowledge of the law
and of his office as Praetor. Cicero appeals to argued ethos to
make his audience (1) beniuolum, or open-minded, (2)
attentum, or attentive, and (3) docilem, or susceptible to
instruction. These three goals are achieved in conjunction with
each other. Cicero pursued beniuolentia throughout his speech.
First, he says that public opinion has practically given an
unspoken verdict against Cluentius. In §3, 74 Cicero asks the
jury not to approach the case with prejudice, or inuidia, and to
be open-minded enough to allow any of their preconceived
opinions to be altered by the force of reason by being docilem.
Beniuolentia and docilem, however, are not enough. Cicero
moves on to attain attentos in §775 through his argued ethos. He
shows from the beginning that what he is about to say is
important, new, and hard to believe, and he shows that it
pertains to important people, to the Gods, and to the good of

72. Id. at 13.
73. Hodge, supra n. 70, at 377-79.
74. ld. at 225.
75. Id. at 227-29.
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the republic. 76 Cicero appeals through the Invention topic of
Testimony through the Supernatural when he says, "Heaven
grant me a favorable hearing from you.'m In appealing to the
Supernatural, Cicero implies that if the jury does not listen,
they will defy the gods, who are on Cluentius's side, and incur
the gods' wrath. Cicero's goal in this rhetorical plea is to give
the jury a personal interest in the matter, so they are more
likely to care how they decide.
Cicero also improves his argued ethos in § 878 when he
promises the jury that his defense will be brief. At the same
time, he outlines the summa causae of his oration so that it will
be logical and easy for his audience to follow. Further, even
though he could have his client acquitted on a technical matter,
Cicero grants Cluentius's wish that he not be defended on lege,
or legal details. This portrays Cicero as a man who wants to do
what is right for his client. It also portrays his client as
necessarily innocent on the merits.
Finally, Cicero removes prejudice through negative ethos, by
logically proving that the prosecution's accusation that
Cluentius bribed the court is false. Cicero then tears down
Oppianicus's martyr-like status by outlining Oppianicus's
crimes in §§9-42, 79 syllogism upon syllogism, leading the jury
to conclude that Oppianicus in fact attempted to poison
Cluentius and succeeded in murdering several others. Cicero's
use of negative ethos eliminated the prejudice against
Cluentius and placed blame on his opponent.
2. Cochran's Emphasis on Ethos in People v. O.J. Simpson

Like Cicero, Cochran deals with the problem of inudia, or
prejudice, because millions of people watched O.J. Simpson flee
from police cars and helicopters after his ex-wife's murder on
national television. Cochran dispels his audience's suspicions
by using argued ethos to make the audience beniuolum as
Cicero did. Cochran sculpts himself and his client as
wholesome, normal people. He cordially pays deference to the
families of the victims, as well as to the defendant's family in
order to personalize O.J. Simpson while also showing that
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 225-29.
Id. at 229.
Id.at 229-31.
Id. at 231-65.
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Cochran is professional and sympathetic.
Cochran uses the rhetorical device of praeteritio, or "passing
by" an idea or weakness, in order to gain the jury's trust and
dispel prejudice by addressing the jury in the following way:
"The Defendant, Mr. Orenthal James Simpson, is now afforded
an opportunity to argue the case, if you will, but I'm not going
to argue with you, Ladies and Gentlemen. What I'm going to do
is try and discuss the reasonable inferences which I feel can be
drawn from the evidence."8° Cochran "passes by" the idea that
he will be arguing anything. He uses this technique to lull the
jury into thinking it will be determining the facts on its own,
while Cochran will simply characterize the facts for them. This
tactic bolsters Cochran's argued ethos because it puts him in a
different category than the stereotype of the pushy and
dishonest lawyer that many of the jurors may have brought to
trial.
Cochran also admits his weaknesses and uses litotes, or
deliberate understatement, to gain the trust of the jury. This is
a technique with which many modern American lawyers are
familiar. He tells the jury that if he does say something wrong,
the jury should not hold that against his client. Cochran also
admits that he talks too fast, and the court reporters should
reprimand him. This is a very effective rhetorical device
because the most difficult man to argue against is the man who
admits he is wrong. This shows that even if a well-trained,
educated lawyer can make mistakes, the prosecution, the
policemen, and even the jury can make mistakes.
Cochran builds up his client's ethos much more extensively
than Cicero did. He repeats throughout the closing argument
how proud the defense team was to have the privilege of
defending such an incredible man in this "journey towards
justice."81 Cochran also uses the topic of Invention of Precedents
to paint pictures of O.J. Simpson having hamburgers at
McDonalds with friends and attending his child's recitals.
Cochran then uses the topic of Invention of Contraries by
juxtaposing these pictures with the prosecution's pictures of
O.J. as a murderous, insane, and uncivilized dog. 82
Cochran puts himself on the level of his listeners by using a
80. See Off. Tr. at 7, People v. Simpson, Case No. BA097211, 1995 WL 686429
(Cal. Super. L.A County Dept. 103 1995).
81. I d. at xx.
82. Id. at 20-21.

299]

TEACHING ORAL ADVOCACY

319

very conversational tone and using mostly one-syllable words
to improve his argued ethos. He uses the rhetorical figure of
speech polysyndeton, a string of conjunctions designed for
persuasive emphasis:
[And] if you stand the witnesses that we presented who
stand unimpeached, unimpeached, and if you are left
with dogs starting to bark at 10:35 or 10:40, 10:40 let's
say--and we know from the most qualified
individuals ... this was a struggle that took from five to
fifteen minutes. It's Already 10:55. And remember, the
thumps were at 10:40 or 10:45-0.J. Simpson could not
be guilty. He is then entitled to an acquittal. 83
Cochran uses this rhetorical device to pile up evidence in
favor of his client, which is similar to the way Cicero used
negative ethos and piled up evidence against Oppianicus.
Cochran does not have a substantial reputation among the
jury as Cicero did, so he spends no time on prevenient ethos.
Cochran does use negative ethos, however, by focusing on the
incompetence of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
and the prosecution. Cochran says that the LAPD and the
prosecutors are more concerned with their own images than
with doing professional police work. 84 Cochran characterizes
the prosecution as gloomy and distrustful, overly "speculative,"
and reliant on conjecture through the topic of Invention
Definition. 85

C. Pathos
Pathos is the mode of proof concerned with appealing to the
audience through emotions. The word is derived from the
Greek pathein, "to experience."
1. Cicero's Use of Rhetoric to Appeal to the Jury's Pathos
One of Cicero's most crucial appeals to pathos comes in §3, 86
when he argues against inuidia, or prejudice. He also uses
causa communis, putting the jury in the defendant's place. In
§8, 87 Cicero inspires fear in the jury. He uses the topic of
83. Id. at 19.
84. Id. at 9.
85. Id.
86. Hodge, supra n. 70, at 225.
87. ld. at 229-31.
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Invention of Division when he asks his jury to look at his client,
one part, and relate him to themselves, or the whole, in order
to see that prejudice will not only affect his client, Cluentius,
but it will affect all of them. 88 By asking the jury to put
themselves in Cluentius's place, they can feel the pain
Cluentius has felt by being prejudged for eight years. Cicero
uses causa communis to threaten the jury that if they give in to
the prejudice they will lose their very identity as judges who
are supposed to be fair and uphold the right, and that
something bad could also happen to them if they convict an
innocent man.
Cicero uses personification of prejudice and innocence to
induce feelings of fear in the jury. "Everyone should fear
prejudice," he says, "because it is the murderer of innocence."89
Cicero says that though "prejudice may lord it at a public
meeting, it must hide its head at a court of law ."9° Cicero uses
this device to bring a graphic image to the jury and induce
them to feel shame and impropriety if they allow prejudice into
the court. Since the jury is composed of noble, educated
statesmen, they would not want to do something improper.
Cicero implies that the nonrational feelings of inuidia against
Cluentius are inappropriate and base. Ironically, he convinces
the jury of his conclusion precisely by arousing base, negative
feelings in them about being associated with people who make
illogical decisions simply based on feelings.
In §195, Cicero appeals to the jury's pathos with the
rhetorical device of the Supernatural through the topic of
invention of Testimony. He says, "Gentlemen, chance has made
you as gods, to sway for all time the destiny of my client, Aulus
Cluentius."91 Cicero thus praises the jury and persuades them
to take its decision seriously. Contrary to what its members
may have thought before Cicero's oration, Cicero's rhetoric
persuades the jury that there is actually a question as to
whether Cluentius is guilty. Cicero intends for the jury to
relish in this question because it is through this question they
retain their divine status. Further, the jury will conjure images
of Roman mythology in their minds. Having heard stories of
gods who were unmerciful when dealing with humans such as
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
!d.
Id.
Id.

at 225.
at xx.
at 227.
at 433.
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themselves, Cicero hopes the jury will not be so harsh with his
client.
2. Cochran's Overwhelming Appeal to Pathos
After strengthening himself through his appeal to ethos,
Cochran focuses on pathos. He engages in an encomium, or a
speech of praise, where he glorifies the jury more extensively
than Cicero through the stylistic device of hyperbole, or
exaggeration, and exalts them as a "truly marvelous jury."92
Cochran emphasizes this point with an appeal to the rhetorical
Invention topic of Authority by citing Abraham Lincoln: ''jury
service is the highest act of citizenship."93 This is especially
effective because Cochran appeals to a predominantly black
jury who would associate Lincoln with emancipation. Cochran
later develops the theme of racial freedom.
The jury agrees with everything Cochran has said to this
point since they cannot argue with his praise. Then, Cochran
gives the final test of their service as jurors: "the quality of the
verdict that you render and whether or not that verdict speaks
94
justice as we move towards justice." Here Cochran uses the
topic of Invention of Past Fact and Future Fact. He implies that
the jury's future verdict will determine the quality of their past
service. This imposes a responsibility on the jury to listen to
Cochran's words closely, so that they will not make a misstep
in the "journey toward justice."
Cochran then appeals to the emotions of the jury by
reminding them that Mr. Orenthal James Simpson is "on trial
for his life."95 Once the members of the jury are aware of the
seriousness of their role-almost gods because they will control
O.J. Simpson's life-Cochran reminds them that he was the
one who placed them in this important role. He claims that the
defense attorneys as well as the prosecution were very, very
careful to select people who would be fair to both sides. 96 This
tactic places Cochran in a position above the jury, as if they
have a duty to him. In being fair to both sides, Cochran says, as
he artfully requests beniuolentia of the jury, they must "keep

92. See Off. Tr. at 7, Simpson, 1995 WL 686429.
93. Id. atx.
94. Id. at 7.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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an open mind ... no one can tell you what the facts are." 97
Cochran leads the jury to feel noble and then convinces them
that if they do not listen to Cochran's version of the facts, and if
they have any prejudice against O.J. Simpson, the jury is
throwing off that coat of nobility.
In another attempt to appeal to the emotions of the
audience, Cochran relies on the Invention topic of Testimony
through the devices of Authority and the Supernatural, similar
to Cicero but on a grander scale. He says, "Sister Rose said a
long time ago, 'He who violates his oath profanes the divinity of
Faith himself.' And, of course, both sides of this lawsuit have
faith that you'll live up to your promises and I'm sure you'll do
that."98 Cochran uses the stylistic device of antanaclasis when
he uses the word "faith" in two different senses. Even though
he says both sides have faith, since Cochran is the one
speaking, he entreats the jury to think about his faith in them
to acquit. He links the faith that the defense has in the jury
with that "Faith," or God, to which Sister Rose refers. Cochran,
like Cicero, appeals to the Supernatural to stir fear in the jury.
He causes the jury to believe that if they convict O.J. Simpson,
then they will be defying the truth that O.J. is innocent, that
truth that only resides in God.
Additionally, in appealing to the jury through pathos,
Cochran speaks on the idea of freedom and brotherhood. He
uses the pronoun "we", bringing everyone together as one. He
forces the jury to put themselves in O.J. Simpson's shoes, using
the rhetorical device causa communis. Cochran uses the
stylistic scheme of rhetorical questions to stir the jury's
imagination: Would the jury like to be locked away forever?
Would they like to lose their freedom? He again uses Authority
by quoting Frederick Douglas, who said shortly after the slaves
were freed, "In a composite nation like ours as before the law,
there should be no rich, no poor, no high, no low, no white, no
black, but common country, common citizenship, equal rights
99
and a common destiny." This Authority appeals to the jury,
mostly Blacks, by stirring within them a collage of memories
and experiences, calling them to the duty to free another Black
man, O.J. Simpson, and enabling them to realize Douglas's
dream.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 8.
99. Id.
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As a final appeal to freedom, Cochran characterizes the
detective in charge of the investigation as a racist. He
emphasizes "there is a Caucasian hair on that glove," that the
detective was a liar, and that the jury would not convict "black"
man O.J. Simpson because they are the guardians of justice. 100
Cochran uses this approach to warn the jury that they might
face a racist prosecution. Cochran's words leave the jury
passionate and worried about racism-something far from the
possibility or probability that O.J. Simpson murdered his exwife.
D.

Logos

Logos is the mode of proof appealing to reason, found in the
words of the speech itself-the interface between speaker and
audience. Logos is the most complex of the three appeals, and
can easily cause confusion. Also, if the audience cannot follow a
rational argument, they might lose focus. Ancient Roman legal
orators used formal logic, or syllogistic theory. Aristotle defined
a syllogism as "a logos in which, when certain things have been
posited, something else proves as a result to be necessarily
so."101 Generally, orators used two rhetorical bases for the
syllogisms in their arguments from logos: (1) enthymemes for
deduction and (2) examples for induction. 102 Rhetorical
syllogisms follow several enthymematic patterns and often
depend on probabilities. They are very useful in legal rhetoric
because there is no universal agreement on what may be
termed probable.
1. Cicero's Prominent Appeal to Logos
Although Cicero uses all three modes of proof, he theorizes
that pathos and ethos are simply support for the foundation of
the case-logos. Cicero posited that the case should speak for
itself. The orator was merely the vehicle to bring forth the
truth. Since logos is characterized by the words themselves
rather than by the orator's personality or the audience's
feelings, this is the perfect appeal to accomplish Cicero's goal of
finding and expressing truth. Cicero uses several
enthymematic patterns in Pro Cluentio-this study will only
100. Id. at 76.
101. Kirby, supra n. 64.
102. Id. at 78.
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examine semeion, diuisio, non sequitur, and Stasis Theory.
A semeion is a pattern of enthymeme that relies on
probability (as in "where there's smoke, there's fire" because
the smoke is caused by the fire and signifies it). 103 In §25,
Cicero gives us a semeion:
All who flee are (probably) guilty, and aware of it;
Oppianicus fled;
Therefore Oppianicus was guilty and aware. 104
Cicero is a master of human psychology and constructs this
syllogism so that the first premise is in the very beginning, but
then he leaves out facts that will complete the syllogism until
the end, when the jury can draw its own inferences and
conclusions. Using this rhetorical device was effective because
the jury was prejudiced against Cluentius, and Cicero wanted
the jury to discover the ultimate truth by drawing inferences
themselves.
Cicero also masterfully uses the enthymematic pattern of
diuisio, or partition, which falls under Division. Cicero uses
diuisio to play the opposing arguments against each other,
showing the jury by process of elimination which arguments
are true. For example, in §64 105 , Cicero assumes the premise
that the court in Oppianicus's trial had been bribed. He uses
diuisio to show the possible explanations: (1) If the jury was
bribed either by Oppianicus or Cluentius, And if not by
Cluentius, Then by Oppianicus, and (2) If the jury was bribed
by either Oppianicus or Cluentius (but not both), And if by
Oppianicus, Then not by Cluentius. 106 Even though Cicero
leaves out the premise that both Cluentius and Oppianicus
could be guilty, he openly states several possibilities for the
jury to weigh and by which to make a judgment. 107 This has
immense cognitive appeal. By partitioning the problem into all
of its possible conclusions, Cicero gives the audience a sense of
completeness, so that the jury is not left with any doubt that
Cluentius is innocent.
Cicero also uses Non sequitur, or complete Refutation of his
103. ld. at 87.
104. ld. at 88.
105. Hodge, supra n. 70, at 289.
106. Kirby, supra n. 64, at 95.
107. W. Peterson, M. Tulli Ciceronus Pro A. Cluentio Oratio, (Macmillan 1899).
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opponent's argument, as an appeal to logos. In §92 108 , Cicero
explains that even if others who Cluentius was accused of
conspiring with to bribe the jury were guilty, this does not
mean that Cluentius is guilty. This device helps Cicero show
that the argument posited by the prosecution has no logical
merit. 109 Cicero's tactic is simple and easy for the jury to follow;
yet it refutes the prosecutions argument.
Stasis Theory is Cicero's final appeal to logos. This theory is
a system of Invention to determine the point at issue. The
system consists of four basic categories: stokhasmos, horos,
poiotes, and metalepsis, or Fact, Definition, Quality, and
Transference. 11° Classical judicial orators asked themselves
three questions: (1) an sit "Whether a thing is"; (2) quid sit
"What it is"; and (3) quale sit "What kind of thing it is?"
Pleading a case under stasis of fact is to answer the first
question negatively. If the answer is affirmative, the stasis
moves to the second question of whether it was a crime. If the
orator answers affirmatively, he must move to stasis of
Quality, the question of whether the crime really was criminal,
or whether it could be justified under the circumstances.
Transference is the last chance doctrine, where an advocate
must attempt to free the defendant by a legal technicality. 111
In Pro Cluentio, Cicero attacks the issue under a double
stasis. He begins the case under the strongest stasis of Fact,
claiming that Cluentius is innocent of either bribing the jury at
Oppianicus's trial or poisoning Oppianicus later. But, as
alluded to, Cicero can also attack the prosecution under
Transference because Cluentius is a member of the Equestrian
order and thus is technically not liable under the Lex Cornelia,
a statute worded to apply only to Senators. Cicero chooses to
abandon Transference, however, because he is certain that his
client is innocent and that the jury will acquit on the merits.
2. Cochran's Limited Appeal to Logos
Cochran uses logos less than any of the three appeals. His
Stasis Theory is one of Fact, and he sets out to show the jury
that O.J. Simpson is completely innocent. He uses the stylistic
108.
109.
110.
111.

Hodge, supra n. 70, at 319-21.
Kirby, supra n. 64, at 98.
See Burton, supra n. 32.
Kirby, supra n. 64, at 109.
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rhetorical device of metaphor to help the jury visualize this:
O.J. Simpson is cloaked in a presumption of innocence-just as
everyone on the jury is. 112 Cochran claims Simpson, an innocent
man, is on trial because there was an incompetent
investigation of the facts. Cochran argues that had the
prosecution been more careful or checked out other suspects,
his client would have quickly been set free.
Unlike Cicero, Cochran eventually relies on Transference.
He details the semantics of the term "reasonable doubt" to
persuade the jury that even if they believe O.J. Simpson was
guilty of murder, they had to acquit on a technicality. Cochran
explains the instruction "Sufficiency of the Circumstantial
Evidence," which states
A finding of guilt as to any crime may not be based on
circumstantial
evidence
unless
the
proved
circumstances are not only (1) consistent with a theory
that the defendant is guilty of a crime, but (2) cannot be
reconciled with any other rational conclusion. Further,
each fact which is essential to complete a set of
circumstances necessary to establish the defendant's
guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 113
Mr. Cochran leads the jury along an interpretation of this
instruction through an enthymeme. He tells the jury that if
both the prosecution's interpretation of evidence and the
defendant's interpretation of evidence seem reasonable, then
they must find for the one that points toward innocence. He
continues by saying that if the prosecution is unreasonable and
the defense is reasonable, they must find for the defendant.
Finally, Cochran explains that only if the prosecution is totally
reasonable, and the defense is totally unreasonable, can the
jury convict. 114 Through the topic of Possible I Impossible,
Cochran assures the jury that all evidence in favor of O.J.
Simpson is reasonable and that the prosecution's
circumstantial evidence is unreasonable. He argues that O.J.
Simpson is arthritic, old, and even clumsy. He then juxtaposes
this with the prosecution's characterization of the evidence that
the murder was stealthy. 115 This device leads the jury to believe
it was impossible for Simpson to have committed the murder.
112. Off. Tr. at 109, Simpson, 1995 WL 686429.
113. ld. at 19.
114. Id. at 20.
115. I d. at 42.
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Cochran also appeals to logos as he continually repeats the
term "common sense." He argues that the prosecution's theory
does not make sense. Therefore, it ''just makes sense" to set
O.J. Simpson free. He implies that the members of the jury
would only convict Simpson if they had no common sense.
Cochran refers to the topic of Invention of Testimony through
the device of maxim: "If it doesn't fit, you must acquit."116
Cochran uses this phrase as an allusion to the gloves used in
the murder. Cochran says the glove does not fit.
E. Comparing Cicero and Cochran on a Larger Scale: The
Significance of the Rhetorical Analysis
After comparing Cicero and Cochran on a smaller scale, we
may turn to a larger scale comparison of the two orators and
the significance of their respective rhetorical techniques to
contemporary legal education.
1. Review of Similarities

From the rhetorical analysis of Cicero's Pro Cluentio and
Cochran's closing argument in People v. O.J. Simpson, we can
see, that despite the two-thousand years that have passed
between their careers, Cicero and Cochran used similar
rhetorical devices. Both orators used negative ethos to (1)
dissuade the jury from believing prejudice that has preceded
their clients and (2) tear down the prosecution. Both orators
also used some degree of argued ethos to gain the jury's trust,
to get their attention, and to make them more open-minded
and receptive to instruction. In their appeals to pathos, both
Cicero and Cochran praised their juries with the rhetorical
device of encomium, likening the jury unto gods, and then,
when Cicero and Cochran secured the jury's attention, they
used the rhetorical Invention device of causa communis in
order to put the juries in the place of their defendants and to
inspire passionate emotions and fears. Both orators also
appealed to the topic of Invention of Testimony through the
Supernatural. Whereas Cicero appealed to Roman, pagan gods,
Cochran focused on the Christian God. Finally, both orators
appealed to logos, though to varying degrees and with different
motives.

116. I d. at 19.
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2. Overview of Differences: Cicero's and Cochran's Diverse
Means and Ends
Cicero and Cochran used different techniques. Cicero
largely used rhetorical topics of Invention and devices of Style
to appeal to logos; yet, he used ethos and pathos to bolster
logos. This emphasis on logos was effective because it helped
Cicero (1) develop a sound logical structure and (2) increase the
predictability and certainty of the court's decisions because it
allowed Cicero to "discover" the truth through syllogisms and
topics of Invention. Cochran, on the other hand, focused most
of his oratorical energies on appeals to pathos and ethos. While
Cochran's appeal may have been appropriate to persuade a
jury of laypersons, it lacked the depth and complexity of
Cicero's argument. This resulted in (1) a disorganized structure
and (2) lack of certainty up until the verdict was announced.
Both Cicero and Cochran chose to use different means because
they were seeking different ends. Cicero sought to use
epistemic rhetoric to find truth and lead his jury to truth and
public virtue in the long run. Cochran sought to use any device
he could to simply win the case at hand.
Cicero used rhetorical topics of Invention and Style to
create a strong, unified structure for an argument that flows
syllogism upon syllogism to the truth of whether Cluentius
murdered Oppianicus. Cicero created an intricate network of
syllogisms that unify the beginning, middle, and end of his
argument. Cicero used syllogistic theory and other rhetorical
devices from logos not only to generate a sound logical
structure to persuade his jury, but also to lead Cicero himself
and the jury to the truth prior to his closing argument. After
using epistemic rhetoric to find truth, Cicero was so certain
that the court would find his client innocent on the merits of
the case that he decided to forego pursuing his Transference
argument that the statute the prosecutor was using did not
apply to his client. Cicero's extensive use of logos assured that
he, the jury, and the public looking on would generally come to
the same conclusion. Cicero was also appealing to a jury of
Roman men educated in the law, rhetoric, and politics. He
could not supine the jury simply with emotional stories or
distract them wi~h unrelated issues simply to appeal to pathos.
He would not have been taken seriously unless his logic was
sound.
Of the two parts to syllogistic theory, Cochran used more
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examples in his appeal to logos than Cicero. Aristotle found
that use of example as rhetorical argument was more suited to
deliberative oratory-which is similar to religious sermonsand enthymeme was more suited to judicial. 117 Although
Cochran may not have been conscious of it, he organized only
one enthymeme in his entire closing argument. He made
haphazard references to authorities like Abraham Lincoln,
Sister Rose, and Frederick Douglas. 118 This technique may have
been an effective way of securing the audience's attention
periodically, especially since his jury is mostly composed of
people who might respect such authorities. Still, Cochran
lacked organization in his use of example and other language
devices and lost the overall unification and cognitive effect that
Cicero attained by using systematic rhetoric to secure a sound
structure. Cochran pleased his audience in spurts to regain
their attention, but he steered away from the spine of the case
onto the ribs too often in digressions. Even Cochran's
119
contemporaries agree that this is not a good tactic.
Cochran's oft-repeated reference to "common sense" was an
appeal to logos that bolstered his ethos and pathos by relating
to the average citizens on the jury and removing the barrier
between legal theory and a layperson's understanding. This
tactic did not, however, help Cochran improve the
predictability of the jury's decision. Cochran merely hoped that
his client could win the case on the merits, but he had no way
of knowing whether O.J. Simpson was innocent or guilty. So,
Cochran relied on a technicality of semantics in the jury
instructions' definition of reasonable doubt. Therefore, Cochran
did not achieve the overwhelming consensus through ethos and
pathos that Cicero achieved through solid logos. Millions of
people, many of whom had been watching the trial hour after
hour for the past year, were in suspense until the minute those
fated words were uttered: not guilty. 120 Even Simpson's
appellate lawyer Alan Dershowitz began preparing for an
appeal when he heard that the jury had a verdict. Many
Americans believed that O.J. Simpson was factually guilty. 121
Whereas Cochran used logos to bolster his pathos and ethos,
117. Kirby, supra n. 64, at 99.
118. See Off. Tr. at x, 8, Simpson, 1995 WL 686429.
119. Gordon, supra n. 1, at 781.
120. Dershowitz, supra n. 71, at 12.
121. Id. at 14.
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Cicero used rhetorical devices from pathos and ethos to
decorate and bolster his underlying logos. For example, Humor
was an important stylistic device for both Cicero and Cochran
to appeal to pathos. Cochran used simple, conversational
humor that would increase his argued ethos by creating
emotions of happiness in the jury. Cicero, on the other hand,
used a complex form of Irony that demanded his jury to have
knowledge of politics, history, rhetoric, and law. Cicero's
humor, through an appeal to pathos, actually bolstered his
logos because his Irony incited contemplation and cognition in
his jury. Such complex humor, contrarily, may not have been
appropriate for the modern jury that Cochran was addressing.
Additionally, Cicero only touched on his own reputation and
did not spend much time building up Cluentius's character but
Cochran heavily emphasized his own qualities and spent much
of his closing argument convincing the jury that he and his
client were good people. Cochran may have emphasized
himself, however, because he did not have a well-established
reputation with the jury as Cicero did. Alternatively, Cicero
declared:
It is a great mistake to consider the speeches we deliver
before the courts as a faithful depository of our personal
opinions. All these speeches emanate from the cause
and the circumstances rather than the man and the
orator, for if the cause could speak for itself, there would
be no need of counsel. We are therefore called upon not
to utter our own maxims, but to bring out everything of
significance that the cause can furnish. 122
Cicero relied on rhetorical methodology and specifically logos
because he viewed it as the best way to let the words and the
facts speak for themselves. Cloaked in pathos and ethos, logos
would create the clearest path to truth.
Conversely, Cochran appealed heavily to pathos in
developing the theme of racism in the case and inspiring the
jury to acquit Simpson with the spirit of freeing a Black man
from bondage. Cochran obviously saw pathos as his most
effective appeal for his audience. But according to this
methodology, the jury could have decided one way that day
because of the feelings that were stirred within them, and they
could have decided another way another day if different
122. Gordon, supra n. 1, at 788.
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feelings were stirred within them. However, this may be
effective because in a criminal trial the prosecution cannot
appeal. In most cases, the jury finds the defendant guilty, but
many cases have been reversed on appeal because of improper
. b efiore a Jury.
.
123
appea1s t o passwn
Perhaps the reasons why each of these orators used
different means in their legal argumentation can be found in
their legal education; and perhaps the reasons for such
differences will also become clearer as we examine how
different Cicero's and Cochran's ends were. Both Cicero and
Cochran professed that their purposes were to find truth.
However, they each defined truth differently. For Cicero,
justice, as in coming to a proper conclusion based on the details
of the law, was not an end in itself; impliedly, neither was
winning. 124 Neither of these ends necessarily manifested truth.
For Cicero truth was the answer to the question: "Did
Cluentius kill Oppianicus?" The purpose of Cicero's argument
also extended to the ethics of classical rhetoric. Cicero hoped
that he, the jury, and the public would all find truth, and this
would serve as a method for preserving public virtue and a
125
stable society.
Cochran's definition of truth was much narrower. The
theme of his closing argument is "a journey towards justice."126
Cochran implied that justice is defined according to the
technicalities of the law. Alan Dershowitz, appellate lawyer on
Simpson's defense team who worked closely with Cochran, shed
some light on the definition of truth: "The truth is that most
criminal defendants are guilty. Prosecutors, therefore,
generally have the ultimate truth on their side. But since
prosecution witnesses often lie about some facts, defense
attorneys have intermediate truth on their side. Not
surprisingly, both sides emphasize the kind of truth that they
have more of." 127 Cochran used means that would help him win
small victories, or intermediate truths so that he could achieve
his ultimate end: acquittal. Cochran may have desired a more
methodological approach to help him find the absolute truth,
but he relied on those oratorical skills familiar to his profession
123. Id. at 779.
124. Enos, supra n. 67, at 16.
125. Id.
126. Off. Tr., Simpson, 1995 WL 686429.
127. Dershowitz, supra n. 73, at 35.
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in contemporary American law. He did the best with what he
had, and many of his techniques will still be useful as law
schools improve methods for teaching oral advocacy, but these
methods are certainly not comprehensive.
V. CONCLUSION

Contemporary American law schools should adopt classical
legal rhetoric as Cicero used it into legal argumentation
methodology for two reasons: first, epistemic rhetoric leads to
ultimate truth and public virtue; second, rhetorical methods
appealing to logos lead to juridical predictability and sound
intellectual structure for legal argumentation. ThoPgh current
methods of oral argumentation may help trial lawyers achieve
momentary effects on a jury, these victories are fleeting. Using
the ethics and methodology of rhetoric as exemplified by Cicero
in Pro Cluentio will help law students develop solid skills that
will help them and the judicial system in the long run.
Although much is written today about the importance of
oral advocacy, there is no concrete methodology, despite the
fact that good oral advocacy skills do not magically descend
upon law students once a dean places a diploma in their hands.
Good oral advocacy requires training and structured practice in
addition to intellect and talent. Law schools must stop
skimming over oral advocacy as an afterthought in the firstyear curriculum. As the system now stands, many students
could leave law school at the top of their classes without having
developed skills in trial oral advocacy. Oral advocacy is crucial,
whether a student eventually argues before the Supreme
Court, negotiates in small claims court, discusses a legal theory
with a senior partner, speaks with a client, or professes to
future law students.
Rhetoric is a quarry of golden bricks for law schools as they
attempt to build systems of methodology for oral advocacy
pedagogy. The Classical System can serve as a blueprint for
modern law schools. Advocacy instructors may not use exact
replicas of rhetorical exercises in the classroom, but they may
do well to use the processes and exercises tried for
imitation,
declamations,
suastoriae,
controversiae,
progymnasmasta, and the rhetorical devices flowing from the
canons of rhetoric: Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory,
and Delivery in appealing to ethos, pathos, and logos. The
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examples in this study are only a sampling of the catalogues of
exercises, techniques, and examples that rhetoric can offer to
law students as they develop their arguments. Furthermore,
many orators use techniques similar to classical rhetorical
methods, but these techniques could be improved. Law schools
might take the pieces of current oral advocacy and add them to
the foundation of rhetoric for an extremely effective pedagogy.
Rhetoric will also combat moral decay. Through rhetoric,
legal orators may be able to gain the public trust that has been
lost by lawyers who are so concerned with winning a case they
will twist language in every way to achieve their end.
Prominent lawyer, F. Lee Bailey's, ideal could be achieved: "In
the law we have substituted rhetoric for the sword, and if we
were more successful and enjoyed more public confidence, more
people would be content to use our courts to resolve their
disputes instead of trying to settle them themselves, often with
disastrous consequences. "128
The well-known philosopher and statesman Benjamin
Disraeli defined justice as "truth in action." As rhetoric
continues to grow in the American tradition of legal oratory,
and as law students carry with them rhetorical, hopefully the
practice of justice will evolve toward that ideal of "truth in
action," rather than simply fulfilling the technicalities of the
law.

Jennifer Kruse Hanrahan

128. F. Lee Bailey, To Be A Trial Lawyer (Telshare Pub. Co. 1982).
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APPENDIX A
RHETORICAL TOPICS OF INVENTION

Common Topics
Definition
A. Genus
B. Division
Comparison
A. Similarity
B. Difference
C. Degree
Relationship
A. Cause and Effect
B. Antecedent and Consequence
C. Contraries
D. Contradictions
Circumstance
A. Possible and Impossible
B. Past Fact and Future Fact
Testimony
A. Authority
B. Testimonial
C. Statistics
D. Maxims
E. Law
F. Precedents (Examples)
G. Supernatural
Special Topics
A. Epideictic
B. Judicial
C. Deliberative
Source: Edward P.J. Corbett. Classical Rhetoric for the Modern
Student 97 (3d ed., Oxford U. Press 1990).
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APPENDIXB

STYLE: MOST COMMONLY USED FIGURES OF SPEECH
DEFINED

Tropes: Artful deviations from the ordinary or principal
signification of a word.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Reference to One Thing as Another
Wordplay and Puns
Substitutions
Overstatement/ Understatement
Semantic Inversions

Schemes: Artful deviations from the ordinary arrangement of
words.
1. Structures of Balance
2. Changes in Word Order
3. Omission
4. Repetition
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APPENDIX C
EXTENDED LIST OF CLASSICAL RHETORICAL FIGURES

A listing of some of the classical rhetorical figures will help
us understand the sheer magnitude of options and exercises
rhetoric has to offer to legal orators.
-A-

anacephalaeosis

apagoresis

-C-

abissio

anacoenosis

aphaeresis

cacemphaton

abominatio

anacoloutha

aphorismus

cacosyntheton

abuse

anacoluthon

apocarteresis

cacozelia

acaloutha

anadiplosis

apocope

catachresis

accismus

anamnesis

apodioxis

catacosmesis

accumulatio

anangeon

apodixis

cataphasis

acervatio

anaphora

apologue

cataplexis

acrostic

anapodoton

apophasis

categoria

acyrologia

anastrophe

apoplanesis

characterismus

acyron

anemographia

aporia

charientismus

adage

anesis

aposiopesis

chiasmus

adhortatio

antanaclasis

apostrophe

chorographia

adianoeta

antanagoge

apothegm

chreia

adjudicatio

antenantiosis

appositio

chronographia

adjunct

anthimeria

ara

circumlocutio

adjunctio

anthropopatheia

articulus

climax

admonitio

anthypophora

aschema tis ton

coenotes

adnexio

anticategoria

asphalia

commoratio

adnominatio

anticipation

assonance

communicatio

adynaton

antilogy

assumptio

comparatio

aequipollentia

antimetabole

asteismus

complexio

aeschrologia

antimetathesis

astrothesia

comprobatio

aetiologia
affirmation

antiphrasis

asyndeton

conceit

anti prosopopoeia

auxesis

concessio

aganactesis

anti ptosis

aischrologia

antirrhesis

-B-

allegory

antisagoge

barbarism

conduplicatio
congeries

alleotheta

antistasis

battologia

conjunctio

alliteration

antisthecon

bdelygmia

consonance

amara irrisio

antistrophe

benedictio

contrarium

ambiguous

antithesis

bomphiologia

contrary

amphibologia

antitheton

brachylogia

conversio

ampliatio

antonomasia

conclusio

correctio
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-D-

epanodos

-H-

mempsis

deesis

epanorthosis

hendiadys

merismus

dehortatio

epenthesis

heterogenium

mesarchia

deinosis

epergesis

homiologia

mesodiplosis

dendrographia

epexegesis

homoeosis

mesozeugma

deprecatio

epicrisis

homoioptoton

metabasis

descriptio

epilogus

homoioteleuton

me tale psis

diacope

epimone

horismus

me tallage

diaeresis

epiphonema

hydrographia

metaphor

dialogismus

epiplexis

hypallage

metaplasm

dialysis

epistrophe

hyperbaton

metastasis

dianoea

epitasis

hyperbole

metathesis

diaphora

epitheton

hypotyposis

metonymy

diaskeue

epitrochasmus

hypozeugma

mimesis

diastole

epitrope

hypozeuxis

mycterismus

diasyrmus

epizeugma

hysterologia

diazeugma

epizeuxis

hysteron proteron

dicaeologia

erotema

digressio

ethopoeia

-1-

dilemma

eucharistia

icon

dirimens copulatio

euche
eulogia

indignatio

oeonismus

distinctio

insinuatio

ominatio

distributio

euphemismus

interrogatio

onedismus

eustathia

inter se pugnantia

onomatopoeia

-E-

eutrepismus

intimation

optatio

ecphonesis

example

irony

orcos

ecphrasis

excitatio

isocolon

oxymoron

ecthlipsis

exclamatio

effictio

excursus

elenchus

exergasia

noema

-J-

-0-

-P-

paenismus

ellipsis

exouthenismos

emphasis

expeditio

enallage

expolitio

-L-

enantiosis

exuscitatio

litotes

-K-

palilogia
parabola

enargia
encomium

-N-

paradiastole
paradiegesis
paradigma

-F-

energia

-M-

paradox

macrologia

paraenesis

enigma

-G-

martyria

paragoge

ennoia

geographia

maxim

par alipsis

enthymeme

gnome

medela

parallelism

enumeratio

graecismus

meiosis

paramythia

membrum

para thesis

epanalepsis
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parecbasis

prodiorthosis

schematismus

systole

paregmenon

proecthesis

scheme

systrophe

parelcon

prolepsis

skotison

parembole

prosapodosis

sententia

parenthesis

proslepsis

sermocinatio

pareuresis

prosonomasia

simile

tasis

paroemia

prosopographia

solecismus

tautologia

[2003

-Ttapinosis

paroemion

prosopopoeia

soraismus

taxis

paromoiosis

prosphonesis

sorites

thaumasmus

paromologia

protherapeia

subjectio

tmesis

paronomasia

prothesis

sustentatio

topographia

parrhesia

pro trope

syllepsis

topothesia

pathopoeia

proverb

syllogismus

traductio

perclusio

prozeugma

symperasma

transitio

periergia

pysma

period
periphrasis

-Q-

symploce

transplacement

synaeresis

tricolon

synaloepha

perissologia

synathroesmus

peristasis

synchoresis

-R-

-U-

permutatio

ratiocinatio

synchysis

-V-

personification

repetitio

philophronesis

repotia

syncope
syncrisis

-W-

pleonasm

restrictio

synecdoche

ploce

rhetorical question

syngnome

polyptoton

-X-

synoeciosis

polysyndeton

synonymia

-Y-

pragmatographia

-8-

synthesis

procatalepsis

sarcasmus

syntheton

-Z·

proclees

scesis onomaton

synzeugma

zeugma

Source:
Gideon
0.
Burton,
Silva
Rhetoricae
<http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric/silva.htm> (BYU 19962000).

